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Abstract. We give new proofs of existence of the limit of the discounted values for two person zero-sum
games in the following frameworks: incomplete information, absorbing, recursive. The idea of these new
proofs is to use some comparison criteria.
AMS Classification: 91A15, 91A20, 49J40, 47J20
Keywords: stochastic games, repeated games, incomplete information, asymptotic value, comparison
principle, variational inequalities
1. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to present a unified approach to the existence of the limit value for two
person zero-sum discounted games. The main tools used in the proofs are
- the fact that the discounted value vλ satisfies the Shapley equation [1],
- properties of accumulation points of the discounted values, and of the corresponding optimal strate-
gies,
- comparison of two accumulation points leading to uniqueness and characterization.
We apply this program for three well known classes of games, each time covering the case where action
spaces are compact.
The first class corresponds to games with incomplete information, where the results were initially ob-
tained in Aumann and Maschler [2] and Mertens and Zamir [3] (including also the asymptotic study of
the finitely repeated games). In that case we follow a quite similar approach to Laraki [4]. For absorbing
games the results are due to Kohlberg [5] for finitely many actions, later extended in Rosenberg and Sorin
[6] for the compact case. An explicit formula for the limit was recently obtained in Laraki [7] and we obtain
a related one. The case of recursive games was first handled in Everett [8], with a different notion of limit
value involving asymptotic payoff on plays. It was later shown in Sorin [9] that these results implied also
the existence of the limit value for two person zero-sum discounted games.
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2. Model, notations and basic Lemmas
Let G be a two person zero-sum stochastic game defined by a finite state space Ω, compact metric
action spaces I and J for player 1 and 2 (with mixed extensions X = ∆(I), set of Borel probabilities on I
and Y = ∆(J) respectively), a separately continuous real bounded payoff g on I × J ×Ω and a separately
continuous transition ρ from I × J × Ω to ∆(Ω).
The game is played in discrete time. At stage t, given the state ωt the payers choose moves it ∈ I, jt ∈ J , the
stage payoff is gt = g(it, jt, ωt) and the new state ωt+1 is selected according to ρ(it, jt, ωt) and is announced
to the players. Given λ ∈]0, 1] the total evaluation in the λ-discounted game is
∑∞
t=1 λ(1 − λ)
t−1gt.
The Shapley operator Φ(λ, f) [1] is then defined, for λ ∈ [0, 1] and f in some closed subset F of the set
of bounded functions from Ω to IR, by the formula
Φ(λ, f)(ω) = min
Y
max
X
{
λg(x, y, ω) + (1− λ)Eρ(x,y,ω)f(·)
}
= max
X
min
Y
{
λg(x, y, ω) + (1− λ)Eρ(x,y,ω)f(·)
}
where g and ρ are bilinearly extended to X × Y . For λ > 0, the only fixed point of Φ(λ, f) is the value vλ
of the discounted game.
The sets of optimal actions of each player in the above formula are denoted by Xλ(f)(ω) and Yλ(f)(ω).
Let X = XΩ and similarly Y = Y Ω. For simplicity for any (x,y) ∈ X × Y we denote ρ(x,y, ω) =
ρ(x(ω),y(ω), ω). Also define Xλ(f) = ΠΩXλ(f)(ω) and Yλ(f) = ΠΩYλ(f)(ω).
S denotes the set of fixed points of the projective operator Φ(0, .), and S0 is the set of accumulation points
of the family vλ.
The following lemmas are easy to establish in this finite state framework:
Lemma 1. S0 ⊂ S.
Lemma 2. Assume that vλn converges to v ∈ S0 and that a sequence of optimal actions xλn ∈ Xλn(vλn)
converges to x. Then x ∈ X0(v).
Lemma 3. Let v and v′ be in S and Ω1 = Argmax(v − v′). For any x ∈ X0(v), y ∈ Y0(v′), and ω ∈ Ω1,
the probability ρ(x,y, ω) is supported by Ω1.
Proof. Since v ∈ S and x ∈ X0(v):
v(ω) = Φ(0, v)(ω) ≤ Eρ(x,y,ω)v(·).
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Using a dual inequality as well:
v(ω)− v′(ω) ≤ Eρ(x,y,ω)(v − v
′)(·)
and the result follows. 
3. Games with incomplete information
We consider here two person zero-sum games with incomplete information (independent case and stan-
dard signalling). pi is a product probability p⊗ q on a finite product space K × L, with p ∈ P = ∆(K),
q ∈ Q = ∆(L). g is a payoff function from I × J × K × L to IR where I and J are finite action sets.
Given the parameter (k, `) selected according to pi, each player knows his own component (k for player
1, ` for player 2) and holds a prior on the other player’s component. From stage 1 on, the parameter is
fixed, the repeated game with payoff g(., ., k, `) is played. The moves of the players at stage t are {it, jt},
the payoff is gt = g(it, jt, k, `) and the information of the players after stage t is {it, jt}. X = ∆(I)K and
Y = ∆(J)L are the type-dependent mixed action sets of the players; g is extended on X × Y ×M by
g(x, y, p, q) =
∑
k,` p
kq`g(xk, y`, k, `).
Given (x, y, p, q), let x(i) =
∑
kx
k
i p
k be the probability of action i and p(i) be the conditional probability
on K given the action i, explicitly pk(i) =
pkxk
i
x(i) (and similarly for y and q).
While this framework is not a particular case of section 2 since the set P ×Q that will play the roˆle of
the state space is not finite, it is still possible to introduce a Shapley operator for this game. This operator
is defined on the set F of continuous concave-convex fonctions on P ×Q by:
Φ(λ, f)(p, q) = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
λg(p, q, x, y) + (1 − λ)∑
i,j
x(i)y(j)f(p(i), q(j))
 (1)
= max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
λg(p, q, x, y) + (1 − λ)∑
i,j
x(i)y(j)f(p(i), q(j))

and the value vλ(p, q) of the λ-discounted game is the unique fixed point of Φ(λ, .) on F . These relations
are due to Aumann and Maschler (1966) [2] and Mertens and Zamir (1971) [3].
Xλ(f)(p, q) denotes the set of optimal strategies of player 1 in Φ(λ, f)(p, q).
In this framework any f ∈ F is a fixed point of the projective operator Φ(0, .), that is F = S.
Notice that if C is a bound for the payoff function g, then any vλ is bounded by C as well, and is moreover
C-Lipschitz. The family {vλ} is thus relatively compact for the topology of the uniform convergence, hence
S0, the set of accumulation points of the family {vλ}, is nonempty.
To ease the notations we will denote the sum
∑
i,j x(i)y(j)f(p(i), q(j)) by Eρ(x,p)×ρ′(y,q)f(p˜, q˜). Notice
that p˜ only depends on x and p, and that q˜ only depends on y and q.
For any f ∈ F , Jensen’s inequality ensures that Eρ(x,p)f(p˜, q) ≤ f(p, q). The strategies of player 1 for
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which the equality holds for all f ∈ F are called non revealing and denoted NR(p) = {x ∈ X ; ∀f ∈
F ,Eρ(x,p)f(p˜) = f(p)} = {x ∈ X ; p˜ = p, ρ(x, p) a.s.}. The set NR(q) of non revealing strategies of player
2 is defined similarly.
Finally, the non revealing value u is
u(p, q) = min
y∈NR(q)
max
x∈NR(p)
g(x, y, p, q) = max
x∈NR(p)
min
y∈NR(q)
g(x, y, p, q).
The existence of lim vλ was first proved in [2] for games with incomplete information on one side. It was
then generalized in [3] for games with incomplete information on both sides, with a characterization of the
limit v being the only solution of the system
v = Cavpmin(u, v)
v = Vexqmax(u, v)
where Cav(f) (resp. Vex(f)) denotes the smallest concave function in the first variable which is larger than
f (resp. the largest convex function in the second variable which is less than f).
A shorter proof of this result (including characterization) was established in [4]. The tools used in the
following proof are quite similar to the one used in [4], but the structure differs.
Lemmas 1 and 2 still hold in this framework; we now prove a more precise version of Lemma 3 using
the geometry of P ×Q. Let C (P ×Q) be the set of real continuous functions on P ×Q.
Lemma 4. Let v ∈ S and let f ∈ C (P × Q) be concave with respect to the first variable. If (p, q) is an
extreme point of Argmax(v − f) then: X0(v)(p, q) ⊂ NR(p).
Proof. Let x ∈ X0(v)(p, q) and y ∈ NR(q), then
v(p, q) ≤ Eρ(x,p)×ρ′(y,q)v(p˜, q˜) = Eρ(x,p)v(p˜, q)
while by Jensen’s inequality
f(p, q) ≥ Eρ(x,p)f(p˜, q)
so
Eρ(x,p)(v − f)(p˜, q) ≥ (v − f)(p, q)
which implies that x ∈ NR(p) since (p, q) is an extreme point of Argmax(v − f).

Remark that v ∈ F implies that NR(p) ⊂ X0(v)(p, q) since v is a saddle function, hence in fact
NR(p) = X0(v)(p, q) in the previous lemma.
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Lemma 5. Let xλ ∈ Xλ(vλ)(p, q) and y ∈ NR(q), then
vλ(p, q) ≤ g(xλ, y, p, q).
Proof. By definition of vλ and xλ,
vλ(p, q) ≤ λg(xλ, y, p, q) + (1− λ)Eρ(xλ,p)×ρ′(y,q)vλ(p˜, q˜)
≤ λg(xλ, y, p, q) + (1− λ)vλ(p, q)
using Jensen’s inequality and the fact that y ∈ NR(q). Hence
vλ(p, q) ≤ g(xλ, y, p, q).

Recall that S0 ⊂ S is the set of accumulation points of {vλ} for the uniform norm.
Proposition 6. Let v ∈ S0.
i) Let f ∈ C (P × Q) be concave with respect to the first variable. Then at any extreme point (p, q) of
Argmax(v − f)
v(p, q) ≤ u(p, q).
ii) Let f ′ ∈ C (P × Q) be convex with respect to the second variable. Then at any extreme point (p, q) of
Argmin(v′ − f ′)
v′(p, q) ≥ u(p, q).
Proof. We prove i). Apply Lemma 5 to any sequence {vλn} converging to v. By Lemma 2, their exists
x ∈ X0(v)(p, q) such that
v(p, q) ≤ inf
y∈NR(q)
g(x, y, p, q).
Lemma 4 implies that x ∈ NR(p) (since v ∈ S), and the result follows by definition of u.
ii) is established in a dual way. 
Proposition 6 implies the following corollaries of existence and caracterization of lim vλ:
Corollary 7. vλ converges uniformly as λ tend to 0.
Proof. Let v and v′ in S0 and let (p, q) be any extreme point of Argmax(v − v′). Since v′ is concave in its
first variable, Proposition 6 i) with f = v′(·, q) implies that v(p, q) ≤ u(p, q). Apply now Proposition 6 ii)
to f ′ = v(p, ·) to get v′(p, q) ≥ u(p, q). This yields v(p, q) ≤ v′(p, q), hence v ≤ v′, thus uniqueness. 
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Corollary 8. Any accumulation point v of vλ satisfies the Mertens-Zamir system:
v = Cavpmin(u, v)
v = Vexqmax(u, v)
Proof. Let v be an accumulation point of the family {vλ}. It is enough to prove that v ≤ Cavpmin(u, v)
since, v being concave in p, the other inequality is trivial and a dual argument gives the dual equality.
Denote f = Cavpmin(u, v), and let (p, q) be any extreme point of Argmax(v− f). Since f is concave in p,
Proposition 6 implies that v(p, q) ≤ u(p, q). Hence,
v(p, q) ≤ min(u, v)(p, q) ≤ f(p, q)
and thus v ≤ f . 
Remarks
The proof above also shows that v is the smallest among the functions satisfying w = Cavpmin(u,w).
A similar approach applies word for word to the dependent case, as defined in Mertens and Zamir [3].
The case where the action sets I and J are compact metric can also be handled in the same way, using
the martingales (p˜, q˜) of regular conditional probabilities.
4. Absorbing games
We consider here a special class of stochastic games as defined in Section 2. We are given two separately
continuous (payoff) functions g, g∗ from I × J to [−1, 1] and a separately continuous (probability of
absorption) function p from I × J to [0, 1] .
The repeated game with absorbing states is played in discrete time as follows. At stage t = 1, 2, ... (if
absorption has not yet occurred) player 1 chooses it ∈ I and, simultaneously, player 2 chooses jt ∈ J :
(i) the payoff at stage t is g (it, jt);
(ii) with probability p∗ (it, jt) := 1−p (it, jt) absorption is reached and the payoff in all future stages s > t
is g∗ (it, jt);
(iii) with probability p (it, jt) the situation is repeated at stage t+ 1.
Recall that the asymptotic analysis for these games is due to Kohlberg [5] in the case where I and J
are finite.
As usual denote X = ∆(I) and Y = ∆(J) ; g, p and p∗ are bilinearly extended to X × Y . Let
p∗(x, y)g∗(x, y) =
∫
I×J p
∗(i, j)g∗(i, j)x(di)y(dj). g∗(x, y) is thus the expected absorbing payoff condition-
ally to absorption.
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The Shapley operator of the game is then defined on IR by
Φ(λ, f) = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
{λg(x, y) + (1− λ)(p(x, y)f + p∗(x, y)g∗(x, y)}
= max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
{λg(x, y) + (1− λ)(p(x, y)f + p∗(x, y)g∗(x, y)} .
The following lemma is analogous to Lemma 4:
Lemma 9.
i) Let f ∈ IR such that f ≥ Φ(0, f) and y ∈ Y0(f). Then for any x ∈ X,
p∗(x, y) > 0 =⇒ f ≥ g∗(x, y).
ii) Let f ∈ IR such that f ≤ Φ(0, f) and x ∈ X0(f). Then for any y ∈ Y ,
p∗(x, y) > 0 =⇒ f ≤ g∗(x, y).
Proof. We prove i). Given x ∈ X and y ∈ Y0(f),
f ≥ Φ(0, f)
≥ p(x, y)f + p∗(x, y)g∗(x, y)
and p(x, y) = 1− p∗(x, y), hence the result. 
Given λ ∈]0, 1[, x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , let rλ(x, y) be the induced payoff in the discounted game by the
corresponding stationary strategies: rλ(x, y) = Ex,y
∑
λ(1− λ)t−1gt.
Lemma 10.
rλ(x, y) ≤

g(x, y) if p∗(x, y) = 0
max(g(x, y), g∗(x, y)) if p∗(x, y) > 0.
Proof.
rλ(x, y) = λg(x, y) + (1 − λ) [p(x, y)rλ(x, y) + p
∗(x, y)g∗(x, y)]
hence
rλ(x, y) =
λg(x, y) + (1− λ)p∗(x, y)g∗(x, y)
λ+ (1− λ)p∗(x, y)

Lemma 5 also has an analogue in this setup:
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Lemma 11. Let λ ∈]0, 1[, xλ ∈ Xλ(vλ) and y ∈ Y , then
vλ ≤

g(xλ, y) if p
∗(xλ, y) = 0
max(g(xλ, y), g
∗(xλ, y)) if p
∗(xλ, y) > 0.
Proof. Since xλ is optimal in the discounted game, for any y ∈ Y ,
vλ ≤ rλ(xλ, y)
and the assertion follows from Lemma 10. 
As in the previous part, combining the two lemmas yields:
Proposition 12. Assume that vλn → v and xλn → x with xλn ∈ Xλn(vλn). Let v
′ such that v′ ≥ Φ(0, v′)
and y ∈ Y0(v′), then
v ≤ max(g(x, y), v′).
Proof. For any n and any y ∈ Y , Lemma 11 implies that either vλn ≤ g(xλn , y) or that p
∗(xλn , y) > 0
and vλn ≤ max(g(xλn , y), g
∗(xλn , y)). In that second case, since y ∈ Y0(v
′), the first assertion in Lemma 9
ensures that g∗(xλn , y) ≤ v
′, so in both cases we have vλn ≤ max(g(xλn , y), v
′). Passing to the limit yields
the result. 
Corollary 13. vλ converges as λ goes to 0.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there are two sequences vλn → v and vλ′n → v
′ with v > v′. Up to an
extraction, one can assume that xλn ∈ Xλn(vλn) converges to x and similarly yλ′n ∈ Yλ′n(vλ′n) converges
to y. By Lemma 2, v′ = Φ(0, v′) and y ∈ Y0(v′) so applying Proposition 12 we get v ≤ max(g(x, y), v′),
hence v ≤ g(x, y). A dual reasoning yields v′ ≥ g(x, y), a contradiction. 
We now identify the limit v of the absorbing game.
Definition 14. Define the function W : X × Y → IR by
W (x, y) = med
(
g(x, y), sup
x′;p∗(x′,y)>0
g∗(x′, y), inf
y′;p∗(x,y′)>0
g∗(x, y′)
)
where med(·, ·, ·) denotes the median of three numbers, with the usual convention that a supremum (resp.
an infimum) over an empty set equals −∞ (resp. +∞).
Corollary 15. The limit v is the value of the zero-sum game, denoted by Υ, with action spaces X and Y
and payoff W .
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Proof. It is enough to show that v ≤ w := supx infyW (x, y) as a dual argument yields the conclusion.
Assume by contradiction that w < v.
Let ε > 0 with w + 2ε < v. Consider x ∈ X0(v) an accumulation point of xλ ∈ Xλ(vλ) and let y be an
ε-best response to x in the game Υ. Lemma 9 ii) implies that
inf
y′;p∗(x,y′)>0
g∗(x, y′) ≥ v > w + ε ≥W (x, y),
so that
W (x, y) = max
(
g(x, y), sup
x′;p∗(x′,y)>0
g∗(x′, y)
)
.
Thus, sup
x′;p∗(x′,y)>0
g∗(x′, y) ≤ w + ε < v − ε and similarly g(x, y) < v − ε. The corresponding inequalities
hold with xλ, for λ small enough:
p∗(xλ, y)[g
∗(xλ, y)− (v − ε)] ≤ 0, g(xλ, y) ≤ v − ε
leading by Lemma 10 to vλ ≤ v − ε, a contradiction.

Remarks
The proof of Corollary 15 establishes in itself the existence of the limit v (by doing the same reasoning
with any accumulation point of vλ).
Also notice that this proves that the game Υ has a value, which is not obvious a priori.
5. Recursive games
Recursive games are another special class of stochastic games as defined in Section 2. We are given
a finite set Ω = Ω0 ∪ Ω∗, two compact metric sets I and J , a payoff function g∗ from Ω∗ to R and a
separately continuous function ρ from I × J × Ω0 to ∆(Ω). Ω∗ is the set of absorbing states while Ω0 is
the set of recursive states.
The repeated recursive game is played in discrete time as follows. At stage t = 1, 2, ..., if absorbtion
has not yet occurred and current state is ωt ∈ Ω0, player 1 chooses it ∈ I and, simultaneously, player 2
chooses jt ∈ J :
(i) the payoff at stage t is 0;
(ii) the state ωt+1 is chosen with probability distribution ρ (ωt+1|it, jt, ωt);
(iii) if ωt+1 ∈ Ω∗ absorbtion is reached and the payoff in all future stages s > t is g∗ (ωt+1);
(iv) if ωt+1 ∈ Ω0 absorbtion is not reached and the game goes on.
The study of those recursive games was first done by Everett [8], who proved that the game has a value
when considering the asymptotic payoff on plays.
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As before denote X = ∆(I) and Y = ∆(J), X = XΩ and similarly Y = Y Ω ; ρ is bilinearly extended
to X×Y. Recall that in this framework the Shapley operator is defined from R|Ω0| to itself by
Φ(λ, f)(ω) = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
{
(1− λ)
∑
ω′∈Ω
ρ(ω′|x, y, ω)f(ω′)
}
= max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
{
(1− λ)
∑
ω′∈Ω
ρ(ω′|x, y, ω)f(ω′)
}
where by convention f(ω′) = g∗(ω′) whenever ω′ ∈ Ω∗.
Proposition 16. Let v ∈ S0, and v′ such that maxΩ v(ω)− v′(ω) > 0. Assume that v′(ω) ≥ Φ(0, v′)(ω)
for all ω ∈ Ω1 := ArgmaxΩ(v − v
′). Then v(·) ≤ 0 on Ω1.
Proof. Denote by Ω2 the Argmax of v on the set Ω1, it is enough to prove that v(·) ≤ 0 on Ω2, so we
assume the contrary. Up to extraction, vλn → v, xλn ∈ Xλn(vλn) → x and there exists ω0 ∈ Ω2 which
realizes the maximum of vλn on Ω2 for every n. In particular v(ω0) > 0. Since xλn is optimal, we get for
any y ∈ Y:
vλn(ω0) ≤ (1− λn)
 ∑
ω′∈Ω2
ρ(ω′|xλn ,y, ω0)vλn(ω
′) +
∑
ω′∈Ω\Ω2
ρ(ω′|xλn ,y, ω0)vλn(ω
′)

so by definition of ω0,
(1− (1− λn)ρ(Ω2|xλn ,y, ω0)) vλn(ω0) ≤ (1− λn)
∑
ω′∈Ω\Ω2
ρ(ω′|xλn ,y, ω0)vλn(ω
′).
For simplicity denote ρn = ρ(Ω2|xλn ,y, ω0). If ρn = 1 for infinitely many n, we immediately get v(ω0) ≤ 0
and the requested contradiction, hence we assume that it is not the case. Hence up to an extraction, µn
defined by µn(w
′) =
ρ(ω′|xλn ,y, ω0)
1− ρn
is a probability measure on Ω\Ω2. Then for n large enough, we get
an analogue of inequalities in Lemmas 5 and 11:
vλn(ω0) ≤
1− λn
1− (1 − λn)ρn
∑
ω′∈Ω\Ω2
ρ(ω′|xλn ,y, ω0)vλn(ω
′)
=
(1− λn)(1− ρn)
λn + (1− λn)(1 − ρn)
∑
ω′∈Ω\Ω2
ρ(ω′|xλn ,y, ω0)
1− ρn
vλn(ω
′)
≤ max
0, ∑
ω′∈Ω\Ω2
µn(ω
′)vλn(ω
′)
 . (2)
On the other hand, choose now y ∈ Y0(v′). Since ω0 ∈ Ω2,
v′(ω0) ≥ Φ(0, v
′)(ω0)
≥
 ∑
ω′∈Ω2
ρ(ω′|xλn ,y, ω0)v
′(ω′) +
∑
ω′∈Ω\Ω2
ρ(ω′|xλn ,y, ω0)v
′(ω′)

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so using the fact that v′ is constant on Ω2, we get an analogue to Lemmas 4 and 9:
v′(ω0) ≥
∑
ω′∈Ω\Ω2
µn(ω
′)v′(ω′). (3)
Letting n go to infinity in inequalities (2) and (3), and using v(ω0) > 0, we obtain by compactness the
existence of µ ∈ ∆(Ω\Ω2) such that
v(ω0) ≤
∑
ω′∈Ω\Ω2
µ(ω′)v(ω′) (4)
v′(ω0) ≥
∑
ω′∈Ω\Ω2
µ(ω′)v′(ω′). (5)
Substracting (5) from (4) yields
(v − v′)(ω0) ≤
∑
ω′∈Ω\Ω2
µ(ω′)(v − v′)(ω′)
and since ω0 ∈ Ω1 = ArgmaxΩ(v − v
′), this implies that the support of µ is included in Ω1 and that the
inequality in (4) is an equality. This in turn forces the support of µ to be included in Ω2 = ArgmaxΩ1 v,
a contradiction to the construction of µ. 
Corollary 17. vλ converges as λ goes to 0.
Proof. Assume that there are two accumulation points v and v′ with maxΩ{v − v′} > 0, and denote
Ω1 = ArgmaxΩ(v − v
′). Then Proposition 16 implies that v(·) ≤ 0 on Ω1. A dual argument yields that
v′(·) ≥ 0 on Ω1, a contradiction. 
We now recover a characterization of the limit due to Everett [8]:
Corollary 18. S0 ⊂ L + ∩L−, where A is the closure of A and
L
+ :=

f ∈ RΩ,
Φ(0, f)(ω) ≤ f(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω0
Φ(0, f)(ω) = f(ω) =⇒ f(ω) ≥ 0
f(ω) ≥ g∗(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω∗

(6)
and symmetrically
L
− :=

f ∈ RΩ,
Φ(0, f)(ω) ≥ f(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω0
Φ(0, f)(ω) = f(ω) =⇒ f(ω) ≤ 0
f(ω) ≤ g∗(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω∗

. (7)
We will need the following lemma:
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Lemma 19. For any ε ≥ 0, there exist Ω′ ⊂ Ω0 and v′ ∈ F such that the couple (Ω′, v′) satisfies
a) v′(ω) = g∗(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω∗.
b) v′(ω) = v(ω)− ε on Ω′.
c) v(ω) ≥ v′(ω) > v(ω)− ε on Ω0\Ω′.
d) For any ω ∈ Ω0\Ω′, Φ(0, v′)(ω) > v′(ω).
e) For any ω ∈ Ω′, Φ(0, v′)(ω) = v′(ω).
Proof. This was proved in [10] but we recall the proof for the sake of completeness.
Let E be the set of couples (Ω′′, v′′) ∈ P(Ω0)×F that satisfies properties a) to d). This set is nonempty
since (Ω0, v − ε1ω∈Ω0) ∈ E . Since Ω0 is finite, we can choose a couple (Ω
′, v′) in E such that there is no
(Ω′′, v′′) in E with Ω′′ ( Ω′. Let Ω˜ be the set on which Φ(0, v′)(ω) = v′(ω); we now prove that Ω˜ = Ω′,
hence that (Ω′, v′) also satisfies property e).
By contradiction assume that Ω˜ ( Ω′ and consider, for small α > 0, vα := v
′ + α1
ω∈Ω′\Ω˜. The couple
(Ω˜, vα) clearly satisfies property a) to c) for α < ε. It also satisfies property d) for α small enough by
continuity of Φ(0, ·). So for small α the couple (Ω˜, vα) is in E , contradicting the minimality of Ω′.

We can now prove Corollary 18:
Proof of Corollary 18. Let v ∈ S0, let ε > 0 and define (v′,Ω′) as in Lemma 19. By properties a) to c) ,
‖v − v′‖∞ ≤ ε. If Ω′ = ∅, then property d) implies that v′ ∈ L−. If Ω′ is nonempty, then by properties
b) c) and e) Ω′ = Argmax(v − v′) and Φ(0, v′)(·) = v′(·) on Ω′. Hence, Proposition 16 yields that v(·) ≤ 0
on Ω′. So v′(·) ≤ 0 on Ω′ and v′ ∈ L− as well.
This implies that v ∈ L−, and by duality v ∈ L +. 
Remark 20. This corollary implies in itself that vλ converges, as there is at most one element in the
intersection, see [6] and Proposition 9 in [9].
6. Conclusion
In this paper we proved the convergence of the discounted values of two person zero-sum discounted
games in several frameworks, using a unified approach relying on a comparaison principle beetween the
accumulation points of the discounted values. We also obtained some characterization of the limit. We
believe that this approach can be extended in several directions :
• For other classes of stochastic games, where the existence of a limit value is still to establish :
stochastic games with a finite number of states and compact sets of actions, absorbing games with
incomplete information, and more generally stochastic games with incomplete information.
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• For other evaluations of the payoff beyond the discounted case, for example to prove the convergence
of the value of the n-stage game when n tends to infinity.
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